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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important deci-
sions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the 
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered 
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest.  As a 
special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the Re-
view.  The following topics, the majority of which originate from cases de-
cided between April 2008 and April 2009, are included in the Review: 
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION—ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS PENDING 
ARBITRATION 
CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA) NA V. REIKOWSKI 
In Citibank v. Reikowski,1 Sarah Reikowski appealed a district court 
order that (1) denied her motion to vacate summary judgment; (2) granted 
Citibank summary judgment; (3) denied her motion for a new trial; (4) de-
nied her motion to vacate the order which vacated the stay of litigation 
pending arbitration; and (5) dismissed her counterclaim.2  The North Dako-
ta Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment motion, reversed the or-
der denying summary judgment, and held the litigation should have been 
stayed pending arbitration.3 
Reikowski owed $13,612.45 to Citibank on a credit card account.4  Ci-
tibank sued and obtained a default judgment for the money due.5  In a 2005 
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court vacated the default judgment and 
reversed and remanded the suit.6  In August 2007, Citibank moved for 
summary judgment.7  Subsequently, on September 22, 2007, Reikowski 
moved to stay the litigation pending arbitration.8  The credit card agreement 
terms provided for a litigation stay pending arbitration.9  Citibank agreed to 
arbitrate on September 28, 2007, so long as the arbitration complied with 
the credit card agreement and commenced within 30 days.10  Even though 
the parties agreed to stay the litigation pending arbitration, the district court 
granted Citibank’s motion for summary judgment on October 1, 2007, en-
tered judgment in favor of Citibank on October 24, 2007, and entered an 
order staying litigation pending arbitration.11 
On appeal, Reikowski argued that the district court erred because the 
litigation should have been stayed in lieu of arbitration proceedings.12  To 
support her assertion, she cited sections 3, 7, and 9 of the Federal Arbitra-
 
1. 2009 ND 12, 760 N.W.2d 97. 
2. Reikowski, ¶ 1, 760 N.W.2d at 98. 
3. Id. ¶ 13, 760 N.W.2d at 100. 
4. Id. ¶ 2, 760 N.W.2d at 98. 
5. Id. ¶ 3.  Reikowski represented herself.  760 N.W.2d at 98. 
6. Reikowski, ¶ 3.  See also Citibank v. Reikowski, 2005 ND 133, 699 N.W.2d 851. 
7. Reikowski, ¶ 3, 760 N.W.2d at 98. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id.  
11. Id. at 98-99. 
12. Id. ¶ 4, 760 N.W.2d at 99. 
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tion Act (FAA) and section 7 of the North Dakota Uniform Arbitration 
Act.13  Citibank asserted that Reikowski waived her right to assert the North 
Dakota Uniform Arbitration Act because she did not argue that North Da-
kota law would control in her appeal.14  Instead, Citibank argued that South 
Dakota law should be applied.15  Citibank also noted that Reikowski had 
not argued for South Dakota application of law.16  The credit card agree-
ment contained an agreement that federal and South Dakota law would ap-
ply to any disputes.17 
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Citibank and concluded 
Reikowski had not argued for the application of South Dakota arbitration 
law.18  The court noted its general rule, that the court will not consider 
questions that were not raised before the district court.19  However, the 
court also stated that it will consider and apply the appropriate statutes if the 
results would otherwise be erroneous or incomplete applications of the 
law.20 
Therefore, the court considered South Dakota Codified Law section 21-
25A-7, which provides: “Any action or proceeding involving an issue 
subject to arbitration shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an 
application therefore has been made under § 21-25A-5 [Application to 
compel arbitration] or, if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect 
thereto only.”21  The court stated that section 21-25A-7 required the district 
court to stay the litigation until it considered the motion to stay litigation 
and compel arbitration.22  The court noted that Reikowski made her motion 
to stay litigation and compel arbitration before the court signed and entered 
judgment on the summary judgment motion.23  Moreover, in addition to the 
statute, the court cited Williston on Contracts, which provides “[o]rdinarily, 
a court that is asked to stay proceedings pending arbitration must first 
determine whether parties agreed to arbitrate and the scope of that 
 
13. Id. ¶ 6. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id.  The agreement provides: “Applicable Law:  The terms and enforcement of this 
Agreement shall be governed by federal law and the law of South Dakota, where we are located.”  
Id. 
18. Id. ¶ 7. 
19. Id. (citing Griggs v. Fisher, 2006 ND 255, ¶ 8, 725 N.W.2d 201). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. ¶ 8, 760 N.W.2d at 100 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-7 (2004)). 
22. Id. ¶ 9. 
23. Id. 
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agreement.”24  Because both parties had notified the district court that an 
arbitration agreement existed and that this case fell within the agreement, 
the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred by 
failing to stay the litigation and granting summary judgment.25 
The court also explained that it would have reached the same result un-
der federal law.26  Section 3 of the FAA provides: 
 If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the 
United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an 
agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such 
suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such 
suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agree-
ment, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the 
action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not 
in default in proceeding with such arbitration.27 
The court explained that it had applied South Dakota law to this dispute 
and that section 7 of South Dakota Codified Laws is consistent with the 
FAA.28  Thus, the court vacated the district court’s summary judgment and 
judgment orders, reversed the order denying the motion to vacate summary 
judgment, and remanded the case for entry of an order staying litigation 
pending arbitration.29 
 
24. Id. (citing 21 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:57, at 378 (4th ed. 
2001)). 
25. Id. ¶ 10. 
26. Id. ¶ 11. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. ¶ 12. 
29. Id. ¶ 13. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CIVIL COMMITMENT—PETITION 
FOR DISCHARGE 
IN RE E.W.F. 
In In re E.W.F.,30 E.W.F. appealed an order denying his petition for 
discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual, contending 
the State failed to prove that he was likely to engage in further acts of sex-
ually predatory conduct and that his commitment violated his substantive 
due process rights.31  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.32 
In 1994, E.W.F. (at the time twenty-one years old) molested his five-
year-old niece.33  After pleading guilty to gross sexual imposition in Sep-
tember 1995, he was sentenced to prison.34  Three years later, in September 
1998, he was committed to the North Dakota State Hospital as a sexually 
dangerous individual.35  For the following eight years, E.W.F. waived his 
statutory right to annually petition for discharge.36  In September 2007, he 
petitioned for discharge, and a hearing was held on January 3, 2008.37 
State hospital staff psychologist Lynne Sullivan testified as an expert 
witness for the State during the hearing.38  She testified that E.W.F. still 
suffered from two sexual disorders—paraphelia not otherwise specified and 
pedophilia.39  Dr. Sullivan based her opinion on review of E.W.F.’s prior 
evaluations and current reports of his behavior at the state hospital.40  In 
September 2007, Dr. Sullivan had prepared a Sexually Dangerous 
Individual Annual Re-evaluation Report, which the State filed with the 
district court prior to the hearing.41  The report was not served upon E.W.F. 
or his counsel; nor was it offered by the State at the hearing.42 
The district court found E.W.F. continued to be a sexually dangerous 
individual and denied his petition for discharge on January 9, 2008.43  
E.W.F. appealed, arguing the State failed to prove by clear and convincing 
 
30. 2008 ND 130, 751 N.W.2d 686. 
31. In re E.W.F., ¶¶ 1, 7, 751 N.W.2d at 688-89. 
32. Id. ¶ 1, 751 N.W.2d at 688. 
33. Id. ¶ 2. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. ¶ 3. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. ¶ 6, 751 N.W.2d at 689. 
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evidence that he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory 
conduct and that his substantive due process rights were violated.44  The 
state supreme court reviewed under a modified clearly erroneous standard, 
under which civil commitments of sexually dangerous individuals are af-
firmed unless the district court’s order is induced by an erroneous view of 
the law, or if the court is firmly convinced the order is not supported by 
clear and convincing evidence.45 
E.W.F.’s first argument was that the State failed to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually 
predatory conduct.46  His argument was based on the fact that the State did 
not offer Dr. Sullivan’s written annual report during E.W.F.’s hearing.47  
The court concluded that contrary to E.W.F.’s contention, the State was not 
required to offer the report during the hearing; nor was it required to submit 
the report to E.W.F.48  Under section 25-03.3-17(2) of the North Dakota 
Century Code, the State must conduct an annual examination of a commit-
ted individual’s mental condition, and a report regarding that examination 
“must be provided to the court that committed the individual.”49  The statute 
does not require that the report be offered during the defendant’s hearing; 
nor must the report be submitted to the defendant himself.50  Similarly, the 
court wrote that section 25-03.3-18 of the North Dakota Century Code does 
not require that the written report be offered during the petition for dis-
charge hearing.51 
Furthermore, while E.W.F. did exercise his right to an independent 
psychological evaluation, he did not call the independent psychologist to 
testify during the discharge hearing.52  The court held it was not improper 
for the district court to draw a negative inference from E.W.F.’s failure to 
 
44. Id. ¶ 7. 
45. Id. ¶ 8 (citing In re Hehn, 2008 ND 36, ¶ 17, 745 N.W.2d 631). 
46. Id. ¶ 11.  The State must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, three elements before 
an individual may be committed:  1) That the individual engaged in sexually predatory conduct; 2) 
That the individual has a congenital or acquired condition that is manifested by a sexual disorder, 
a personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and 3) That the condition makes 
the individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct which constitute a 
danger to the physical or mental health or safety of others.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8).  
Here, E.W.F. did not contend the State failed to meet its burden on the first two elements.  In re 
E.W.F., ¶ 11, 751 N.W.2d at 689.  Instead, he argued solely that the State failed to prove, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that he was likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory con-
duct.  Id. 
47. Id. ¶ 12. 
48. Id. ¶ 13, 751 N.W.2d at 690 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-17 and 25-03.3-18). 
49. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-17). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. ¶ 14 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-18). 
52. Id. ¶ 16. 
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call the independent psychologist; indeed, the district court could use the 
negative inference in determining whether there was clear and convincing 
evidence of E.W.F.’s likelihood of engaging in further acts of sexually pre-
datory conduct.53 
E.W.F. next contended that his substantive due process rights were vi-
olated, alleging his civil commitment served as an unconstitutional mechan-
ism for punishing his underlying criminal conviction.54  First, the court con-
cluded E.W.F. gave no factual argument that his psychiatric diagnosis, and 
the severity of the mental abnormality itself, was not sufficient to distin-
guish him from the dangerous, but typical, recidivist convicted in an ordi-
nary criminal case, the standard required by the United States Supreme 
Court case Kansas v. Crane.55  Next, E.W.F. contended that his commit-
ment lasted more than a “potentially indefinite” period of time, in violation 
of the United States Supreme Court holding of Kansas v. Hendricks.56  He 
based this contention on the fact that he had been committed for nine years 
without improvement, and on the fact that the State committed about sixty 
sex offenders in the last ten years, none of whom had been released for suc-
cessful completion in a treatment program.57  The state supreme court de-
termined that the fact that E.W.F. had been at the state hospital for a period 
of nine years, without more, did not show he would remain there indefinite-
ly.58  The court concluded by stating that because E.W.F.’s constitutional 
claims were not supported with substantial fact or law, the claims were not 
ripe for review.59 
The court affirmed the district court’s order denying E.W.F.’s petition 
for discharge.60 
 
53. Id. at 691. 
54. Id. ¶ 17. 
55. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002)). 
56. Id. ¶ 20, 751 N.W.2d at 692 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997)). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. ¶ 21. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. ¶ 22. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL 
TRIALS—JURY QUESTIONNAIRES 
FORUM COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY V. PAULSON 
In Forum Communications Company v. Paulson,61 Forum Communica-
tions petitioned for a supervisory writ directing the district court to vacate 
its order sealing juror questionnaires and any other information that would 
help identify the full names of jurors in a concluded murder trial.62  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court issued a supervisory writ reversing the district 
court’s order and directing the district court to consider Forum Communica-
tions’ request for information under the guidelines set forth by the court.63 
Moe Maurice Gibbs was charged in Barnes County, North Dakota, 
with the murder of Mindy Morgenstern, a Valley City State University stu-
dent.64  The case was assigned to Judge John T. Paulson, a district court 
judge in the Southeast Judicial District.  Pretrial publicity caused the trial to 
be moved from Valley City in Barnes County to Minot in Ward County.65  
The district court approved expanded media coverage of the trial in June 
2007, but also issued an order restricting extrajudicial comments to the pub-
lic or to the media.66 
The State and Gibbs stipulated to the use of a jury questionnaire for 
prospective jurors to answer before trial.67  The thirty-four page question-
naire covered several broad categories, including personal information, res-
idence, family, education, employment, previous employment, personal, 
military, law enforcement and legal contacts, criminal justice system, juror 
service, and miscellaneous.68  The parties also stipulated that the question-
naire would be held confidential, with the exception of distribution to court 
personnel, attorneys-of-record, and the parties themselves.69  The district 
court approved the stipulation.70 
Voir dire proceedings during the Minot trial were closed to the public 
and the media.71  At one point during the trial, a district court judge for the 
 
61. 2008 ND 140, 752 N.W.2d 177. 
62. Forum Commc’ns Co., ¶ 1, 752 N.W.2d at 178. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. ¶ 2. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. ¶ 3. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. ¶ 4. 
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Northwest Judicial District issued a disorderly conduct restraining order 
against a Bismarck resident attending the trial.72  The jury in the Minot trial 
deadlocked on a verdict, and the trial was rescheduled for October 2007, in 
Bismarck.73 
The district court in the second trial issued a scheduling order requiring 
each prospective juror to complete the juror questionnaire used in the first 
trial.74  Forum Communications moved to open courtroom proceedings, in-
cluding voir dire, to the public, to unseal court documents, including the 
completed jury questionnaires, and to vacate the gag order.75  The district 
court ordered that the public be allowed access to jury voir dire, subject to 
closure whenever counsel believed sensitive subjects would be discussed 
with prospective jurors.76  The district court also granted access to a blank 
juror questionnaire, but left intact the order restricting extrajudicial com-
ments.77  During five days of jury selection in Bismarck, the public and the 
media were allowed to attend voir dire, subject to some in camera proceed-
ings, but the jurors were referred to only by their first names and the initial 
of their last names.78  In November 2007, the Bismarck jury returned a 
guilty verdict.79 
In December 2007 and January 2008, Forum Communications asked 
the district court to release the names of the jurors in the Bismarck trial.80  
The district court sealed the juror questionnaires and any other identifying 
information until “such time as any appeal, or any ordered retrial and appeal 
therefrom have been determined.”81  The district court stated as reasoning 
for its order that “the Court gave its word to the jurors . . . that it would pro-
tect those jurors’ identity as confidential.  And . . . the Court had previous 
harassment problems of jurors and counsel from a Bismarck man when the 
case was tried in Minot, North Dakota.”82  Forum Communications peti-
tioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to issue a supervisory writ revers-
ing the district court’s order.83 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 178-79. 
74. Id. ¶ 5, 752 N.W.2d at 179. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. ¶ 6. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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In its decision, the state supreme court began by concluding the case 
was an appropriate one to exercise its original jurisdiction because it in-
volved “issues of vital concern about the interrelationship of guidelines for 
public and media access to court records, for juror privacy, and for a crimi-
nal defendant’s right to a fair trial.”84  Additionally, the court found no ade-
quate remedy by appeal existed to resolve the issues.85 
The court first noted that the general public and the media have a con-
stitutional right of access to criminal trials.86  The court cited Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court,87 a United States Supreme Court case that 
gave two major rationales for the right of access to criminal trials—first, 
that criminal trials have historically been open to the press and the general 
public and second, that openness enhances the quality and safeguards the 
integrity of the fact-finding process for both the defendant and society as a 
whole.88 
The right of access, however, is not absolute.89  The court again cited 
Globe, writing, “Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny 
the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, 
it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmen-
tal interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”90 
The court turned to Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,91 which 
held that jury voir dire is part of a criminal trial and is thus subject to the 
same right of access.92  A presumption exists in favor of jury selection be-
ing as open to the public as any other part of a criminal trial.93  The pre-
sumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings 
that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest.94  Furthermore, the findings must be articulated specifi-
cally enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order 
was properly entered.95 
 
84. Id. ¶ 9, 752 N.W.2d at 180. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-85 (1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505 (1984); Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 
(1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558-81 (1980)). 
87 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
88. Forum Commc’ns Co., ¶ 11, 752 N.W.2d at 181 (citing Globe, 457 U.S. at 604-06). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Globe, 457 U.S. at 604-06). 
91. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). 
92. Forum Commc’ns Co., ¶ 12, 752 N.W.2d at 181 (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 
505). 
93. Id. ¶ 13, 752 N.W.2d at 182 (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 505-10). 
94. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510). 
95. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510). 
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The court stated that the right of access articulated in Press-Enterprise 
has been applied to preliminary jury questionnaires, such as the one at issue 
in Forum Communications.96  Thus, both the public and media have a pre-
sumptive right of access to juror questionnaires that is not absolute and that 
must be balanced against both a defendant’s right to a fair trial and jurors’ 
privacy interests.97  The presumption of openness can be overcome only by 
an overriding interest and must be articulated with findings specific enough 
to permit effective review.98  Finally, any closure must be narrowly tailored 
to serve the competing interests.99 
The court went on to note that section 27-09.1-09(3) of the North Da-
kota Century Code requires public access to jurors’ names unless the inter-
ests of justice require the names be kept confidential.100  The “interests-of-
justice” standard has been interpreted to mean that the trial court must give 
specific and convincing reasons juror identities should be withheld, and that 
withholding should occur only in exceptional cases.101 
Furthermore, the court cited North Dakota Supreme Court Administra-
tive Rule 41, which requires public access to court records, with certain ex-
ceptions.102  The first applicable exception is N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 
41(5)(b)(5), which states that the names of qualified or summoned jurors 
and contents of jury qualification forms are open to the public unless by 
court order disclosure is prohibited or restricted.103  The second applicable 
exception is N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(5)(b)(6), which states that records 
of juror voir dire are not open to the public, unless by court order disclosure 
is permitted.104  Under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41(6)(b), when a request 
for public access is made, a court must decide whether sufficient grounds 
exist to overcome the presumption of openness of court records and may 
prohibit access according to applicable constitutional, statutory, and case 
law.105  In making a decision whether to permit or prohibit access, the court 
must consider that the presumption of openness may be overcome only by 
an overriding interest, which must be specifically articulated and narrowly 
tailored.106 
 
96. Id. ¶ 16. 
97. Id. at 183. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. ¶ 17 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27.09.1-09(3)). 
101. Id. (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 93 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
102. Id. ¶ 18 (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41). 
103. Id. ¶ 19, 752 N.W.2d at 184 (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(5)(b)(5)). 
104. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(5)(b)(6)). 
105. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(6)(b)). 
106. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 41(6)(b)). 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the district court’s 
decision to seal all information pertaining to juror identification was based 
on two articulated reasons:  (1) that the district court gave “its word to 
jurors . . . that it would protect those jurors’ identity as confidential,” and 
(2) “previous harassment problems of jurors and counsel from a Bismarck 
man when the case was tried in Minot.”107  The court found those reasons 
insufficient to rebut the presumption of openness and to warrant a blanket 
closure, stating the public and the media have a First Amendment right of 
post-verdict access to jurors’ names.108 That right may be limited by 
articulated findings to protect privacy or juror safety, but the court found 
nothing in the record to suggest either harassment problems of the jurors 
during the Bismarck trial or any impending threats of juror harassment or 
safety.109  Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not 
articulate any specific findings to support closure to protect juror privacy or 
safety after the jury was discharged.110  Thus, the court held that the names 
of the jurors who were sworn and tried the case to verdict must be released 
after notice was sent to each of them.111 
Next, the court stated that the district court’s findings did not support a 
blanket closure of the Bismarck trial jurors’ questionnaires.112  The desire 
of the trial judge to protect jurors, the court wrote, must be balanced against 
the right to access under the Press-Enterprise test.113  The court also recog-
nized that expanded questionnaires are a way of obtaining personal infor-
mation from perspective jurors in a manner other than in open court.114  Fi-
nally, the court suggested that the expanded jury questionnaires be 
accompanied by a paragraph that states in unambiguous language that the 
questionnaires will become public records, and that prospective jurors can 
respond to the questions by requesting a closed appearance before the judge 
with counsel and the accused present.115  The judge can then decide if that 
portion of jury selection should be available under Press-Enterprise.116 
The court remanded for the district court to consider the questionnaires 
of the Bismarck jurors and to determine if an overriding interest for closure 
overcame the presumption of openness under Press-Enterprise and N.D. 
 
107. Id. ¶ 20, 752 N.W.2d at 185. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. ¶ 21. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 185-86. 
115. Id. at 186. 
116. Id. 
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Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 41.117  The court held that at a minimum, recognized 
privacy concerns required redaction of jurors’ dates of birth and non-public 
addresses and telephone numbers.118  The court also directed the district 
court to consider possible redaction of questions pertaining to medications, 
whether jurors were victims of crimes, and information regarding racial and 
ethnic groups.119  The court exercised its original jurisdiction and issued a 
supervisory writ reversing the district court’s order and directing the court 
to consider Forum Communications’ request for information under the 
guidelines set forth.120 
Chief Justice VandeWalle specially concurred.121  He wrote that in ad-
dition to the law cited in the opinion, N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 9 is also in-
volved in selecting juries.122  Rule 9(5) states that the administration and 
management of the jury system must comply with the Standards Relating to 
Juror Use and Management, which are incorporated in the rule as an appen-
dix.123  Standard 7, which governs voir dire, states that basic background 
information should be made available in writing to counsel or each self-
represented party, unless disclosure is limited by the court in accordance 
with section 27-09.1-09 of the North Dakota Century Code.124  That sec-
tion, as the majority opinion noted, provides that the names of qualified ju-
rors and the contents of jury qualification forms “shall be made available to 
the public unless the court determines in any instance that this information 
in the interest of justice should be kept confidential or its use limited in 
whole or in part.”125  Standard 7 also requires the judge to ensure that the 
privacy of prospective jurors is reasonably protected, and that questioning 
by counsel is consistent with the purposes of voir dire.126 
Chief Justice VandeWalle next noted that N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 9(3) 
provides that the State Court Administrator shall file a jury selection plan 
with the Clerk of the North Dakota Supreme Court.127  Rule 9(3) goes on to 
state that the plan “shall detail the procedures to be followed in selecting 
and managing jurors in order to implement the policies set forth” in the 
 
117. Id. ¶ 22. 
118. Id. 
119. Id.  
120. Id. ¶ 23. 
121. Id. ¶ 26 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring). 
122. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9). 
123. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9(5)). 
124. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-09). 
125. Id. at 187 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-09). 
126. Id. ¶ 27. 
127. Id. ¶ 28 (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9(3)). 
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Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act.128  The jury selection plan recog-
nizes a distinction between the juror qualification form, which contains only 
questions about the qualifications of the prospective juror to sit on any jury, 
and the jury questionnaire, which seeks information that the parties or their 
counsel use in determining whether a prospective juror should be chal-
lenged for cause or peremptorily removed from a panel in a particular 
case.129  It is the questionnaire, Chief Justice VandeWalle noted, that may 
ask questions that call for answers which should remain confidential due to 
juror privacy.130  Thus, in an effort to reasonably protect the privacy of 
prospective jurors, the district court in future cases may be unwilling to al-
low an expanded jury questionnaire.131 
Additionally, Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote, it is problematic that 
counsel will ask each juror the amount of questions that may be included in 
an expanded jury questionnaire during voir dire in open court.132  Therefore, 
he noted, the agreement to keep the questionnaires confidential has some 
logical purpose—but the sweep of confidentiality in this case was too 
great.133  Chief Justice VandeWalle concluded his concurrence by high-
lighting the balancing process between the public’s right to access and the 
juror’s right to privacy.134 
 
128. Id. (citing N.D. SUP. CT. ADMIN. R. 9(3)). 
129. Id. ¶ 30. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. ¶ 32. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. ¶ 33, 752 N.W.2d at 187-88. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—SPECIAL LAWS, PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES, GIFTS 
TEIGEN V. STATE 
In Teigen v. State,135 James Teigen, Deb Lundgren, Greg Svenningsen, 
the North Dakota Farmers Union, and the Dakota Resource Council ap-
pealed a summary judgment dismissing their declaratory judgment ac-
tion.136  They challenged the constitutionality of language in sections 4-28-
07(4) and 4-28-07.1(4) of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to the 
North Dakota State Wheat Commission.137 
The statute requires the North Dakota State Wheat Commission to 
expend at least two mills of a wheat tax for contracts for activities related to 
domestic wheat policy issues, wheat production, promotion, and sales.138  
The statute also requires the contracts to be between no more than two trade 
associations that are incorporated in the state and that have as their primary 
purpose the representation of wheat producers.139  The plaintiffs claimed the 
law effectively compels the State Wheat Commission to contract with two 
specific entities, the North Dakota Grain Growers Association and the 
Durum Growers Association of the United States.140  The plaintiffs also 
claimed the statute violates state constitutional provisions that prohibit 
special laws, gifts, and special privileges and immunities.141 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the law was constitutional, and 
affirmed.142  The court first stated that the issue of whether a statute is 
constitutional is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal.143  It noted 
the court exercises the power to declare legislation unconstitutional with 
great restraint and will not do so unless at least four justices agree on the 
unconstitutionality.144 
The court began its analysis with whether the statute violates the 
special law provision of the North Dakota constitution, which prohibits the 
 
135. 2008 ND 88, 749 N.W.2d 505. 
136. Teigen, ¶ 1, 749 N.W.2d at 507. 
137. Id.  The same language, after the 2009 legislative session, is found in section 4.1-13-23 
of the North Dakota Century Code. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  
143. Id. ¶ 7, 749 N.W.2d at 509. 
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legislature from enacting local or special laws.145  Special laws, the court 
stated, are those relating to particular persons or things of a class.146  The 
plaintiffs argued the effect of the trade association clause is to create a 
special law, contending that while the language of the statute is neutral, the 
underlying intent and effect is that contracts go only to the Grain Growers 
Association and the Durum Growers Association.147 
The court laid out the standard of review of a classification under the 
special laws provision—reasonableness.148  A statutory classification is rea-
sonable, the court stated, if it is “natural, not arbitrary, and standing upon 
some reason having regard to the character of the legislation of which it is a 
feature.”149  The court went on to state that a classification is reasonable if it 
“bears alike upon all persons and things upon which it operates and it con-
tains no provision that will exclude or impede this uniform operation upon 
all citizens, subjects and places within the state provided they are brought 
within the relations and circumstances specified in the statute.”150 
The court then went through previous case law regarding special law 
provisions, noting that the common inquiry in special law cases is whether 
statutory classifications are written in general terms, rather than applying to 
particular persons or things.151  Additionally, if written in general terms, the 
court examines whether the classification “closes the door against acces-
sions to the class.”152  The court recognized that special law challenges nec-
essarily involve statutory interpretation, a question of law fully reviewable 
on appeal.153 
The court stated that the trade association clause is phrased in general 
terms that “contracts may be with no more than two trade associations that 
are incorporated in this state and which have as their primary purpose the 
representation of wheat producers.”154  The plain language of the clause, the 
court opined, does not contemplate a closed class and does not preclude 
other organizations from further accession into the class if they meet those 
qualifications.155  Instead, the clause operates alike for all similarly situated 
 
145. Id. ¶ 9. 
146. Id. ¶ 12, 749 N.W.2d at 510 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Heitkamp, 523 N.W.2d 
548 (N.D. 1994)). 
147. Id. ¶ 9, 749 N.W.2d at 509. 
148. Id. ¶ 13, 749 N.W.2d at 510. 
149. Id. (quoting Best Prods. Co., Inc. v. Spaeth, 461 N.W.2d 91, 99 (N.D. 1990)). 
150. Id. at 511 (quoting Best Prods., 461 N.W.2d at 99). 
151. Id. ¶ 18, 749 N.W.2d at 512. 
152. Id. (quoting Edmonds v. Herbrandson, 2 N.D. 270, 50 N.W. 970 (1891)). 
153. Id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 749 N.W.2d at 513. 
154. Id. ¶ 20. 
155. Id. 
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entities that satisfy the statutory requirements for a contract.156  The court 
also stated that because the language of the trade association clause is clear 
and unambiguous, it would not resort to legislative history or administrative 
interpretation to construe the plain meaning of the statute.157  Thus, the 
court concluded the trade association clause is a general law, and the gener-
al classification for trade associations incorporated in North Dakota that 
have as their primary purpose the representation of wheat producers is rea-
sonable in view of the contractual services sought by the state wheat com-
mission.158 
The plaintiffs next argued that the trade association clause is unconsti-
tutional as a law granting special privileges and immunities under the 
state’s equal protection clause.159  Because the trade association clause in-
volves social and economic legislation regarding the wheat industry, the 
state supreme court applied rational basis scrutiny.160  Under the rational 
basis standard, a legislative classification is sustained unless it is arbitrary 
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.161  
The court concluded it was not unreasonable for the legislature to classify 
trade associations incorporated in the state and having as their primary pur-
pose the representation of wheat producers from other groups for purposes 
of contracting for activities related to domestic wheat policy issues, wheat 
production, promotion, and sales.162  The court further concluded the legis-
lature’s classification of trade associations bore a rational relationship to a 
legitimate government interest of promoting activities related to domestic 
wheat policy issues, wheat production, promotion, and sales.163  Thus, the 
court held the trade association clause satisfies rational basis scrutiny and 
does not violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution.164 
Finally, the plaintiffs argued the trade association clause constitutes a 
gift to the Grain Growers Association and the Durum Growers Association 
in violation of Article X of the North Dakota Constitution, because the 
statute eliminates competitive bidding and the money paid to the two 
associations is unrelated to the services provided.165  Because the amount of 
the final payment from collection of the wheat tax is not known when the 
 
156. Id. 
157. Id. ¶ 21, 749 N.W.2d at 514. 
158. Id. ¶ 23. 
159. Id. ¶¶ 24, 25, 749 N.W.2d at 514, 515. 
160. Id. ¶¶ 25, 26, 749 N.W.2d at 515. 
161. Id. ¶ 26. 
162. Id. ¶ 27. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. 
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contract is executed, the plaintiffs claimed there is no correlation between 
the value received by the state and the funds paid by the state for the 
services—thus rendering the trade association clause a gift.166  The court 
stated that the statute does not contemplate a gift; rather, it contemplates a 
contract for services and does not preclude competitive bidding with 
entities that meet the qualifications imposed by the statute.167  The court 
also noted that the state wheat commission regularly enters into written 
contracts with entities qualified under the statute—contracts that identify 
the services to be performed by the entity, restrict the use of funds received 
from the wheat commission to the performance of those services, and 
impose record-keeping and reporting requirements.168 
The court went on to state that the competitive bidding process helps 
ensure that the state receives a substantial benefit for its contracts and that 
the successful bidders incur a detriment.169  The court determined that 
although the amount of the payments under the contracts is uncertain 
because the statute is based on a per bushel mill assessment, a rational 
relationship exists between larger payments attributable to an increased 
number of bushels of wheat and the services provided because of that 
increased quantity.170  The North Dakota Supreme Court, concluding the 
trade association clause is constitutional, affirmed the judgment of the 
district court.171 
Justice Sandstrom specially concurred.172  He disagreed to the extent 
that dicta in the majority opinion could be read as suggesting that any con-
sideration, no matter how minimal, would be sufficient to defeat the state 
constitution’s prohibition on gifts.173  The state constitutional limitation on 
gifts, he wrote, is the action of the people in general to restrain government 
actors from gifting public funds or property; thus, private-contract consid-
eration is not the appropriate standard to determine whether there has been a 
gift of public funds.174 
 
166. Id. ¶ 29. 
167. Id. ¶ 30, 749 N.W.2d at 516. 
168. Id. ¶ 31. 
169. Id. 
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171. Id. ¶ 32. 
172. Id. ¶ 34 (Sandstrom, J., concurring). 
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CORPORATIONS—PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
AXTMANN V. CHILLEMI 
In Axtmann v. Chillemi,175 Geri Chillemi, as sole shareholder, and 
Michael Jon Natwick, as vice president and secretary, appealed from a 
district court judgment piercing the corporate veil of Main Realty, Inc. and 
voiding the assignments of real estate listings from Main Realty to 
Mainland, Inc.176  The decision arose after Main Realty was unable to 
satisfy a previous jury verdict imposing substantial liability on Main Realty 
due to a real estate transaction concerning Thomas and Arel Axtmann.177  
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision to 
pierce the corporate veil of Main Realty and reversed the part of the district 
court’s judgment imposing liability on Mainland.178 
Geri Chillemi and other individuals incorporated Main Realty, Inc. in 
1985 to purchase the trade name Main and Company Realtors for $20,000 
and to list and sell real estate through its agents.179  Chillemi was the sole 
shareholder, president, and treasurer of Main Realty.180  Michael Jon 
Natwick was the vice president and secretary of Main Realty.181  Chillemi 
and Natwick resided with each other and were also partners in Mainland 
Ventures Unlimited, a partnership that owned commercial property and 
leased office space to Main Realty.182  Chillemi was the designated broker 
at Main Realty, and office policy required its associates to sign a contract 
with Chillemi to establish independent contractor status.183 
Main Realty used a uniform real estate salesperson contract, which es-
tablished that its agents were regarded as independent contractors.184  Under 
the contract, agents received one hundred percent of any earned commis-
sions in exchange for monthly rent and expenses paid to Main Realty.185  
The contract was month-to-month and could be terminated for failure to pay 
rent, which would also cause the commission to decrease to fifty percent.186 
 
175. 2007 ND 179, 740 N.W.2d 838. 
176. Axtmann, ¶1, 740 N.W.2d at 840. 
177. Id. ¶ 5, 740 N.W.2d at 842. 
178. Id. ¶ 25, 740 N.W.2d at 847. 
179. Id. ¶ 2, 740 N.W.2d at 840. 
180. Id. 
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182. Id. 
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184. Id. ¶ 4, 740 N.W.2d at 841. 
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Thomas and Arel Axtmann sued Main Realty and one of its agents re-
garding the purchase of a house.187  A jury found Main Realty and the agent 
jointly and severally liable to the Axtmanns for $75,000 in economic dam-
ages.188  Both the agent and Main Realty were further found guilty of fraud 
and liable for exemplary damages of $45,500 and $19,500, respectively.189 
Following the Axtmann judgment, Main Realty held a special meeting 
of the board of directors, which included Chillemi and Natwick.190  The mi-
nutes of this meeting stated that three of Main Realty’s agents transferred to 
other companies, that the remaining rent from the other five agents was in-
sufficient to cover the company’s cost of doing business, and that it was 
impossible to find new agents to transfer to Main Realty.191  Accordingly, a 
motion was carried to dissolve Main Realty and to vacate its premises.192  
At this meeting, Natwick resigned as vice president and secretary of Main 
Realty in order to form his own company.193  Chillemi filled those vacan-
cies until the corporation was dissolved.194 
On May 19, 2004, Natwick incorporated Mainland, Inc.195  Chillemi 
subsequently signed several agreements in which Main Realty agreed to re-
linquish to Mainland all claims for any commissions for the sale of real es-
tate covered by its listing contract.196  All commissions were to be paid to 
Mainland, and Mainland would be responsible for the listing contract.197  
Mainland did not pay Main Realty any consideration for these assign-
ments.198  On May 28, 2004, Chillemi closed Main Realty’s bank account 
and used the remaining $150.52 to pay the company’s telephone bill.199  
Main Realty was then involuntarily dissolved by the North Dakota Secre-
tary of State for failing to file an annual report.200 
The Axtmanns subsequently levied on Main Realty’s property and re-
ceived a mere $7.52 toward their judgment from a sheriff’s sale of office 
equipment.201  The Axtmanns sued Chillemi, Natwick, Mainland, Main 
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188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. ¶ 6. 
191. Id. 
192. Id.  
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. ¶ 7. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. ¶ 8. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. ¶ 9. 
            
2009] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 523 
Realty, and Mainland Ventures, alleging that Main Realty fraudulently 
transferred the listing agreements and interests in commissions to Mainland 
for no value.202  The Axtmanns sought a declaration that Mainland was a 
successor in interest to Main Realty for purposes of collecting on its prior 
judgment.203  Further, the Axtmanns sought an order piercing the corporate 
veil of Main Realty to impose personal liability on Natwick and Chillemi 
for the company’s debts.204  The district court found that the listing contract 
transfers were fraudulent under chapter 13-02.1 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code and that Mainland was liable for the Axtmann’s judgment against 
Main Realty.205  The court further pierced the corporate veil of Main Realty 
and held Chillemi and Natwick personally liable for the judgment.206  On 
appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Chillemi and Natwick argued 
that the district court erred in piercing the corporate veil of Main Realty.207 
Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote for the majority in Axtmann.  He be-
gan by stating that officers and directors are generally not liable for corpo-
rate debts due to the legitimate corporate principle of limited liability.208  
However, when the corporate structure is used to defeat public convenience, 
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, a corporation will be regarded 
as a mere “association of persons.”209  In making this determination, factors 
to consider include insolvency of the corporation at the time of the transac-
tion in question, siphoning of funds by the dominant shareholder, and the 
existence of the corporation as a mere facade for individual dealings.210  
Furthermore, proof of fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for piercing the 
corporate veil, and there must be a degree of injustice, inequity, or funda-
mental unfairness.211 
The standards for piercing the corporate veil are more flexible in tort 
than in contract.212  Unlike contract actions, which involve an element of 
choice in entering the contractual relationship, tort cases involve unex-
pected occurrences.213  Accordingly, in tort cases, greater significance is 
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placed on corporate undercapitalization.214  Doing corporate business with-
out a sufficient basis of financial responsibility is an abuse of the separate 
entity.215  If the organization is insufficiently capitalized when compared 
with its business dealings and risk of losses and liabilities, undercapitaliza-
tion becomes a ground for piercing the corporate veil.216  The burden of es-
tablishing this basis rests with the party making the claim, and the court 
must make a very fact-specific inquiry.217 
The district court found three grounds for piercing the corporate veil:  
Main Realty was undercapitalized, it was insolvent at the time of the Axt-
manns’ judgment, and it was a “pass through” corporation with no substan-
tial assets.218  Under the clearly erroneous standard of review, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court first addressed the appellants’ argument that Main 
Realty was sufficiently capitalized.219  The appellants maintained that Main 
Realty functioned properly for twenty years, followed corporate formalities, 
and was solvent up until the Axtmanns’ judgment.220 
The district court made particular findings regarding the appellants’ 
primary argument that it was sufficiently capitalized.221  The district court 
found that after Chillemi purchased the business, there was no evidence that 
additional capital was put into the business, and that it was foreseeable that 
Main Realty might be liable for claims by customers, which would require 
further capitalization.222  Further, the district court found that Main Realty 
was insolvent at the time of the Axtmanns’ judgment, as it was unable to 
pay its normal debts and it was forced to rely on Chillemi’s personal credit 
to operate.223 
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that although Main Realty 
met all the statutory requirements of a real estate brokerage firm, it could 
not use its corporate form to avoid foreseeable liabilities.224  The majority 
agreed with the district court and held that the record did not reflect any 
further capitalization of Main Realty for foreseeable liabilities, such as the 
Axtmanns’ judgment.225  Although Main Realty’s salesperson contract 
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provides for different commission percentages in certain situations, the 
record contained no evidence that Realtors were paid anything less than a 
full one hundred percent commission.226  As a result, the listing agreements 
assigned by Main Realty to Mainland belonged to the respective listing 
agent and had no value to Main Realty, which supported the district court’s 
finding that Main Realty was undercapitalized.227 
The majority also recognized that Main Realty’s annual meeting mi-
nutes established that it was not realizing a profit and had outstanding credit 
card debt.228  Chillemi and Natwick had used their personal commissions to 
pay the debt.229  The court determined that although Main Realty may have 
operated for several years, it struggled to satisfy its debt.230  This factored 
into the court’s undercapitalization analysis.231 
After considering Main Realty’s undercapitalization and reviewing the 
record, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not hold that the district 
court’s decision was clearly erroneous.232  However, the court expressly 
concluded that the district court erred in holding that the listing agreement 
transfers to Mainland were fraudulent.233  This conclusion was based on the 
fact that the agreements had no value to Main Realty and belonged to the 
respective agents.234  Therefore, Mainland should not have been liable as a 
continuation of Main Realty, and the court reversed the part of the judgment 
imposing liability on Mainland.235 
Justice Crothers wrote a dissenting opinion in Axtmann.236  Justice 
Crothers concurred with the majority’s opinion reversing the district court 
imposing successor liability on Mainland, but dissented from the part of the 
majority opinion affirming the district court’s piercing of Main Realty’s 
corporate veil.237  Justice Crothers expressed his concern that the majority’s 
holding would make piercing the corporate veil the “rule, rather than the 
exception” and set dangerous precedent.238 
Justice Crothers stated that categorizing a corporation as a “pass-
through” corporation is not per se bad or determinative of inequity because 
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the corporate entity is primarily used for limited liability purposes.239  It is a 
legitimate and recognized reason for the corporate entity.240  Further, Main 
Realty was an S corporation, which is designed to pass income through the 
corporation to the owner-shareholder.241  For these reasons, Justice Crothers 
believed that the majority erroneously characterized Main Realty as a “pass 
through” or “shell” corporation.242 
Justice Crothers also opined that the district court’s finding that Main 
Realty was undercapitalized was erroneous.243  The correct application of 
the law would have required examining the corporation’s capitalization at 
its formation.244  Main Realty was initially capitalized with $20,000 and had 
a very limited operation.245  Therefore, Justice Crothers stated the district 
court erroneously concluded that Main Realty was undercapitalized or 
without profits sufficient to meet its capital needs.246  Instead, the corpora-
tion’s debt should receive little or no weight in the analysis.247  Piercing 
Main Realty’s corporate veil would mean that a corporation must ignore 
realities of organization, finance, and taxation, and have sufficient reserve 
money to pay any substantial judgment.248  Justice Crothers found this re-
sult too hostile to small businesses and inconsistent with legislative intent, 
and therefore dissented.249 
Justice Sandstrom wrote separately, concurring and dissenting from the 
majority opinion.250  Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority’s hold-
ing that Main Realty had no interest in the listing contracts or that they had 
no value.251  The listing contracts were contracts between the owner of the 
property and the broker, Main Realty.252  Because under North Dakota law 
the broker is entitled to receive the commission and any commitment to pay 
the salesperson a commission is an unsecured obligation, the listing con-
tracts were an asset of Main Realty.253  Therefore, according to Justice 
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Sandstrom, Main Realty had a claim against the value of the agreements, 
and their transfers were fraudulent.254 
Justice Kapsner also concurred in part and dissented in part.255  Justice 
Kapsner agreed with the majority in affirming the district court’s piercing 
of the corporate veil, but dissented from the majority holding that reversed 
the judgment imposing liability on Mainland.256  Like Justice Sandstrom, 
Justice Kapsner believed the listing agreements had value to Main Realty 
because of its right to receive rent or partial commissions under them.257  
The agreements were transferred without consideration while Main Realty 
was insolvent.258  Justice Kapsner stated the trial court was not clearly erro-
neous when it found that the transfers were made with intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud the Axtmanns.259  Therefore, Justice Kapsner dissented from 
the majority’s holding that the transfers to Mainland were not fraudulent.260 
Justice Kapsner also criticized the majority for failing to discuss the 
independent basis of successor liability of Mainland.261  Although a 
successor corporation is not generally liable for the debts of the predecessor 
corporation simply due to the transfer of assets, there are exceptions.262  
One such exception is when the successor corporation is a mere 
continuation of the selling company.263  Justice Kapsner determined that 
this exception applied to the facts of the case and thus Mainland was a 
continuation of Main Realty and liable for the entire debt of Main Realty to 
the Axtmanns.264 
In Axtmann, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the district 
court was not clearly erroneous when it found that Main Realty was under-
capitalized.265  Further, the court held that Main Realty acted as a “pass-
through” corporation for purposes of avoiding personal liability on its 
shareholders.266  The court reversed the district court’s judgment imposing 
liability on Mainland because the transfers of the listing agreements had no 
value and, therefore, were not fraudulent.267 
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CRIMINAL LAW—ENDANGERMENT OF A CHILD—APPLICATION 
TO UNBORN CHILDREN 
STATE V. GEISER 
In State v. Geiser,268 Michelle Geiser appealed a district court order 
denying her motion to dismiss the charge of endangerment of a child.269  
The North Dakota Supreme Court held the district court erred when it ap-
plied the charge of endangerment of a child to an unborn child.270  The 
court reversed and remanded to allow Geiser the opportunity to withdraw 
her guilty plea to the child endangerment charge.271 
Geiser allegedly overdosed on prescription drugs when she was twen-
ty-nine weeks pregnant.272  The State asserted that the overdose led to the 
demise of Geiser’s unborn child, and charged her with possession of a con-
trolled substance, ingesting a controlled substance, and endangerment of a 
child or vulnerable adult in violation of section 19-03.1-22.2 of the North 
Dakota Century Code.273 
Geiser filed a motion to dismiss the charge of endangerment of a child 
or vulnerable adult, asserting that the term “child” applied to individuals 
under the age of eighteen and did not include unborn children.274  The dis-
trict court denied the motion, relying on Hopkins v. McBane,275 in which the 
North Dakota Supreme Court held a wrongful-death action could be 
brought against one whose tortious conduct causes the death of a viable un-
born child.276  The district court also relied on Whitner v. South Carolina,277 
in which the South Carolina Supreme Court determined a viable fetus was a 
person for the purpose of a statute against child abuse, the minority view 
opinion.278  Geiser entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of child 
 
268. 2009 ND 36, 763 N.W.2d 469. 
269. Geiser, ¶ 1, 763 N.W.2d at 470. 
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who knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or vulnerable adult to be exposed to, to 
ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug para-
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22.2(2). 
274. Geiser, ¶ 4, 763 N.W.2d at 470. 
275 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984). 
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endangerment, reserving her right to appeal the district court’s denial of her 
motion to dismiss.279 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the denial.280  The court 
began by noting that the issue of whether the charge of endangerment of a 
child applies to an unborn child is one of statutory interpretation, a question 
of law that is fully reviewable on appeal.281  Section 19-03.1-22.2(1)(b) of 
the North Dakota Century Code states that for the purposes of the child en-
dangerment section, “child”  is defined as “an individual who is under the 
age of eighteen years.”282  When interpreting statutes, the court stated, it has 
a duty to ascertain the legislature’s intent.283  The court construes the words 
of a statute in their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood sense.284  Be-
cause the State advocated an expansive interpretation of “child” to include 
unborn children, the court reviewed extrinsic evidence to further interpret 
and construe the statute and to determine whether the State’s interpretation 
was consistent with legislative intent.285 
The first extrinsic evidence the court examined was legislative 
history.286  The legislative history of section 19-03.1-22.2 did not indicate 
that the state legislature intended the statute to apply to unborn children.287  
The legislative history did explain that the law was modeled after a Utah 
statute, but neither the Utah Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court of 
Utah has analyzed whether the Utah statute applies to an unborn child.288 
The court next looked to the Code itself.289  Section 14-10-01 of the 
North Dakota Century Code states, “Minors are persons under eighteen 
years of age.  In this code, unless otherwise specified, the term ‘child’ 
means ‘minor.’  Age must be calculated from the first minute of the day on 
which persons are born to the same minute of the corresponding day com-
pleting the period of minority.”290  Thus, the court stated, whether the legis-
lature used “child” or “minor” is irrelevant, because the terms are equiva-
lent under the Code.291  Additionally, the court stated, the legislature 
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provided that the age of a child is calculated from the day on which the 
child is born, and thus an unborn child is neither a child nor a minor.292 
The court next distinguished Hopkins from the case at hand.293  In 
Hopkins, the court held that North Dakota’s wrongful-death statute autho-
rized a claim to be brought against one whose tortious conduct caused the 
death of a viable unborn child—thus, an unborn child has rights against a 
third party in a wrongful-death action.294  However, the court stated, 
Hopkins does not necessarily imply that an unborn child has rights against 
the mother.295  In Hopkins, the statute interpreted was remedial, and thus the 
court construed it liberally.296  The child endangerment statute, by contrast, 
is criminal, and criminal statutes are strictly construed in favor of the de-
fendant and against the government.297 
Additionally, following Hopkins, the legislature enacted chapter 12.1-
17.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, which recognized the rights of un-
born children against actions of third parties.298  This, the court stated, 
makes it clear that when the legislature intends to cover unborn children, it 
does so expressly.299  Chapter 12.1-17.1 makes it a crime for a person to 
commit several acts (such as murder and assault) against an unborn child, 
but the legislature determined that for purposes of that statute, “person” 
does not include the pregnant woman.300  Thus, the mother of an unborn 
child cannot be charged with a crime against her unborn child under chapter 
12.1-17.1.301 
Therefore, the court stated, its holding that a pregnant woman cannot 
be charged for a crime allegedly committed against her unborn child under 
section 19-03.1-22.2(1)(b) coincides with both Hopkins and chapter 12.1-
17.1.302  The court concluded by holding section 19-03.1-22.2 of the North 
Dakota Century Code does not apply to an unborn child.303  The court re-
versed and remanded the district court order to allow Geiser an opportunity 
to withdraw her guilty plea to the charge of endangerment of a child.304 
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Justice Sandstrom specially concurred.305  He agreed with the majority 
that the conviction must be set aside, writing that under the separation of 
powers system, it is not the role of the court to criminalize what the legisla-
ture has not clearly made criminal.306  He disagreed, however, with the ma-
jority that the court should rely on section 14-10-01 of the North Dakota 
Century Code for its definition of a “child.”307  The introductory language 
of that section, he wrote, specifically provides that it applies only if no other 
definition is supplied.308  In the case at hand, section 19-03.1-22.2 provides 
that “‘child’ means an individual who is under the age of eighteen years.”309 
Justice Sandstrom further stated that extensive review of the legislative 
history of section 19-03.1-22.2 reflected no discussion of the application of 
that statute to unborn children.310  Additionally, the legislature specifically 
excluded the mother from the application of section 12.1-17.1-01(2), the 
statute relating to conduct causing the death of an unborn child.311 
Justice Sandstrom then noted that the great majority of states which 
have decided the issue at hand have determined that similar statutes do not 
apply to unborn children.312  He concluded that lenity requires deference to 
the accused when the scope of a statute does not clearly apply, and agreed 
that the criminal judgment must be reversed.313 
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CRIMINAL LAW—SEARCH AND SEIZURE—GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
STATE V. LUNDE 
In State v. Lunde,314 Marcus Lunde appealed from a criminal judgment 
entered upon his conditional plea of guilty to possession of marijuana with 
intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance, and two counts of 
possession of drug paraphernalia.315  The North Dakota Supreme Court, 
holding that the district court erred in applying the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule, reversed and remanded to allow Lunde to withdraw 
his guilty plea.316 
In August 2006, a magistrate found probable cause existed and issued a 
search warrant for Lunde’s West Fargo apartment, based on an application 
and affidavit submitted by Officer Jason Hicks of the West Fargo Police 
Department.317  In his affidavit, Officer Hicks detailed information he had 
received from other law enforcement officials.318  The affidavit stated that 
on August 3, 2006, Officer Hicks had spoken with Special Agent Donald 
Burns of the Central Minnesota Drug Task Force.319  Burns told Officer 
Hicks that he and Detective Chuck Anderson of the Clay County Sheriff’s 
Department had spoken to a confidential informant whose name and identi-
ty were known to both Burns and Anderson.320  The confidential informant 
told Burns and Anderson that the informant had associated with two indi-
viduals in a drug trafficking organization, one of whom was a suspect in a 
federal narcotics case in Minnesota and another who was known as 
“Slim.”321  The informant later identified Slim as Lunde.322  The informant 
also told Burns and Anderson that he had met with Slim in the parking lot 
of Slim’s West Fargo apartment, where the informant said he transferred 
money gram receipts from drug transactions to and from Slim.323  The in-
formant stated that Slim was involved in selling marijuana and methamphe-
tamine, that the informant often collected drug debts and kept a debt ledger 
 
314. 2008 ND 142, 752 N.W.2d 630. 
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for Slim, and that the informant would return the money collected to Slim’s 
apartment.324 
Officer Hicks’ affidavit went on to state that on August 2, 2006, he had 
spoken with Anderson, because Anderson was attempting to identify 
Slim.325  Officer Hicks had information about a person who might be 
Slim—on July 21, 2006, the West Fargo Police Department assisted the 
Moorhead Police Department in attempting to locate “CJ,” and a Moorhead 
Police Department detective had received an anonymous tip that CJ was 
staying with Lunde at his apartment in West Fargo.326  The affidavit stated 
that Lunde allowed the officers to check the apartment for CJ and that 
Lunde told officers he had not seen CJ since July 16, 2006.327 
The affidavit also stated that on July 20, 2006, Burns had conducted an 
interview of a “cooperating individual” who was “fully identified” by 
Burns, but who wished to remain anonymous.328  According to the affidavit, 
the cooperating individual had lived with a person who associated with 
Slim and believed Slim to be involved in trafficking controlled sub-
stances.329  Also according to the affidavit, Burns reviewed the electronic 
telephone listing of a cellular telephone taken from a suspect in a large fed-
eral narcotics case at the time of his arrest.330  The listing included a cell 
phone number for Slim.331 
On the basis of Officer Hicks’ affidavit, the magistrate found probable 
cause and issued a search warrant for Lunde’s apartment.332  On August 3, 
2006, Lunde was charged with various drug crimes as a result of the search 
warrant’s execution.333  In January 2007, Lunde moved the district court to 
suppress the evidence from his residence, contending that the search war-
rant was not supported by probable cause, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and Article 1, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution.334  
The district court denied the motion, holding that while there was no proba-
ble cause for the search warrant, the good faith exception applied.335 
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In May 2007, Lunde entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.336  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded to allow Lunde to withdraw his 
guilty plea, finding the district court erred in applying the good faith excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule.337 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that it 
will reverse a district court’s denial of a suppression motion where the deci-
sion lacks sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting its 
findings, and where the decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence.338  Whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant is a 
question of law, and thus fully reviewable on appeal.339 
The court, viewing the totality of the circumstances and not looking 
beyond the four corners of the affidavit, agreed with the district court that 
probable cause did not exist to support the issuance of the search warrant 
for Lunde’s apartment.340  However, the court found insufficient competent 
evidence existed to support the district court’s decision that a good faith ex-
ception applied to the state’s exclusionary rule.341 
In arriving at its conclusion, the court first stated that it has not yet de-
cided whether North Dakota’s constitution precludes recognition of the 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.342  Generally, the exclusio-
nary rule requires suppression of evidence that is seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.343  Various exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply, however, in-
cluding the good faith exception, recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Leon.344  Under the good faith exception, evidence 
is not excluded when an officer has acted in good faith upon objectively 
reasonable reliance on the issuing magistrate’s probable cause determina-
tion.345 
In State v. Herrick,346 the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized four 
situations in which the good faith exception does not apply, because an of-
ficer’s reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable:  (1) when the is-
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suing magistrate was misled by false information intentionally or negligent-
ly given by the affiant; (2) when the magistrate totally abandoned her 
cial role and failed to act in a neutral and detached manner; (3) when the 
warrant was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as 
to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when 
a reasonable law enforcement officer could not rely on a facially deficient 
warrant.347  In Herrick, the court applied the Leon good faith exception to a 
statutory violation of the North Dakota Century Code.348  Because the issue 
before the court in Herrick was a statutory violation, rather than a violation 
of the state constitution, the court did not rule on whether the state recog-
nizes a good faith exception to North Dakota’s exclusionary rule.349 
In Lunde, the court continued to leave the question open, holding that 
insufficient competent evidence existed to support the district court’s deci-
sion that a good faith exception applied.350  Thus, the court did not address 
whether North Dakota’s constitution precludes recognition of a good faith 
exception to the state’s exclusionary rule.351  The court held that Officer 
Hicks’s affidavit supplied merely a tenuous and conclusory suggestion that 
Lunde was involved in criminal activity.352  Furthermore, the court stated, 
the warrant was based upon stale information from an uncorroborated con-
fidential informant who was part of the criminal milieu.353  The affidavit 
failed to establish a fair probability that evidence would be found in the 
places to be searched.354 
Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the good 
faith exception did not apply, the court did not address whether North Da-
kota’s constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures 
precludes recognition of the good faith exception to the state’s exclusionary 
rule.355  The court reversed the criminal judgment and remanded to the dis-
trict court to permit Lunde to withdraw his conditional guilty plea.356 
Justice Sandstrom dissented.357  He wrote that probable cause was 
established; there is a good faith exception under the North Dakota 
Constitution; and, if there was not probable cause for the issuance of the 
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search warrant, there was substantial indicia of probable cause and good 
faith reliance on the warrant by law enforcement—thus the good faith 
exception would apply.358 
Justice Crothers also dissented.359  While he agreed with Justice 
Sandstrom that a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule exists under 
the North Dakota Constitution and that it applied in Lunde, he did not agree 
that the search was supported by probable cause.360 
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CRIMINAL LAW—WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS—
ESTABLISHING A FAIR AND JUST REASON 
STATE V. LIUM 
In State v. Lium,361 Travis Lium appealed a district court order on re-
mand denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.362  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion when it held that Lium failed to establish a fair and just reason to allow 
him to withdraw his guilty plea.363 
Lium was charged with attempted murder, a class A felony, in June 
2006.364  In February 2007, under a written plea agreement, he entered 
Alford pleas to one count of aggravated assault and one count of reckless 
endangerment, both class C felonies.365  The plea agreement stated that the 
State would ask the district court to impose a five-year sentence for each 
charge, with the time to be served consecutively.366  Also under the plea 
agreement, Lium could argue for a lesser sentence, but for no less 
incarceration than seven and a half years.367 
At Lium’s change-of-plea hearing, the district court informed Lium 
that he would waive his rights by pleading guilty.368  The district court also 
confirmed that Lium understood the plea agreement and the elements of the 
charges against him and that Lium had reviewed the plea agreement with 
his attorney.369  Furthermore, Lium stated that no threats had been made to 
induce him to enter the plea.370  The district court then accepted Lium’s 
guilty pleas and ordered a presentence investigation.371 
On February 23, 2007, Lium wrote a letter to the district court, stating 
that he wanted to rescind his earlier pleas and that he wanted either a new 
attorney or perhaps to represent himself.372  Before sentencing, Lium ob-
tained new counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea.373  He claimed 
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that his former attorney had threatened to withdraw if he did not plead 
guilty, that he was innocent, and that he had a defense to the charges.374  
The district court denied Lium’s motion to withdraw his pleas, concluding 
that the pleas were voluntary and intelligent and that withdrawal was not 
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.375  Lium appealed to the North 
Dakota Supreme Court, which remanded the case to the district court to de-
termine whether a fair and just reason existed to allow Lium to withdraw 
his pleas.376 
On remand, based on a review of the file, transcript, counsels’ argu-
ments and motions, and Lium’s supporting affidavit, the district court again 
denied Lium’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.377  The district court 
concluded that Lium failed to establish a fair and just reason to allow with-
drawal.378 
Lium appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, contending four 
fair and just reasons existed to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea—that 
he asserted his innocence through his post-plea district court filings and the 
nature of his Alford plea; that he asserted a legal defense to the charge when 
he informed the district court he was defending himself; that he informed 
the district court that his plea was coerced; and that he informed the district 
court that his prior attorney had given ineffective assistance of counsel.379 
In its analysis, the North Dakota Supreme Court first laid out Rule 
32(d) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea.380  Under that rule, after a guilty plea is ac-
cepted, but before sentencing (such as in Lium’s case), the defendant may 
withdraw a guilty plea if necessary to correct a manifest injustice or, if al-
lowed in the court’s discretion, for any fair and just reason, unless the pros-
ecution has been prejudiced by reliance on the plea.381  The court went on to 
state that the “fair and just” reason for withdrawal of a guilty plea involves 
a lesser showing than is required to establish “manifest injustice.”382 
Rule 32(d) is meant to be construed liberally in favor of the defendant, 
but withdrawal is not a matter of right.383  Once a defendant establishes a 
fair and just reason, the burden shifts to the State to establish that it would 
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be prejudiced by granting leave to withdraw.384  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court will not reverse the district court’s determination of whether a fair 
and just reason exists, unless the district court abuses its discretion.385 
The state supreme court recognized that the fair and just reason 
standard is not well understood.386  Thus, the court laid out nine factors that 
a district court may consider in determining whether a fair and just reason 
exists to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing: (1) the amount of time 
that has passed between the entry of the plea and the motion to withdraw; 
(2) defendant’s assertion of innocence or a legally cognizable defense to the 
charge; (3) prejudice to the government; (4) whether the plea was knowing 
and voluntary; (5) whether the plea was made in compliance with Rule 11 
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure; (6) whether adequate 
assistance of counsel was available to the defendant; (7) the plausibility of 
the reason for seeking to withdraw; (8) whether a plea withdrawal would 
waste judicial resources; and (9) whether the parties reached or breached a 
plea agreement.387  The factors are not an exclusive list, however, and other 
factors, depending on the circumstances, may be relevant.388 
The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Lium’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
as it made specific findings on Lium’s assertion of innocence, his assertion 
of a legal defense to the charge, the knowing and voluntary nature of his 
plea, the quality of the legal assistance he received, and the benefit he re-
ceived from entering the plea agreement.389  The court went through each of 
the four factors in turn. 
First, the district court reviewed the record and made a credibility de-
termination that Lium did not attempt to withdraw his guilty plea because 
he was innocent, but rather because he wanted a less severe penalty.390  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court stated it would not second-guess the district 
court’s credibility determinations or re-weigh the evidence, and thus the 
district court did not err in finding Lium did not adequately assert his inno-
cence.391 
Second, the district court found Lium did not adequately raise a legal 
defense.392  While Lium contended on appeal that he was acting in self-
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defense when he stabbed the victim, he did not argue such a claim in the 
brief in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the accompanying 
affidavit, or at the hearing for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.393  In-
stead, he asserted the claim of self-defense only in a post-plea letter to the 
court.394  Thus, the state supreme court held the record supported the district 
court’s finding that Lium did not raise any legal defenses.395 
Third, the district court found Lium was not coerced into pleading 
guilty, but rather voluntarily pled guilty to the lesser charges.396  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court found the district court reasonably concluded, based 
on the evidence and the defendant’s demeanor, that Lium took the plea 
agreement not because he felt threatened by his attorney, but rather to avoid 
a greater penalty.397  Thus, the state supreme court held the district court did 
not err in its finding.398 
Fourth and finally, the district court found unsupported Lium’s claim 
that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel.399  The district 
court concluded, based on the record, that the counsel Lium received was 
“to his benefit,” that he was represented by “seasoned counsel,” and that the 
reduced charges negotiated by his attorneys greatly reduced the potential 
time of incarceration.400  Thus, Lium neither demonstrated that his coun-
sel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness nor 
demonstrated that, but for the unprofessionalism, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different.401  The state supreme court held that the dis-
trict court did not err in its determination that Lium failed to establish that 
his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.402 
Based on the four factors above, the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
cluded that Lium did not establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing his 
plea.403  It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Lium’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and thus affirmed the district 
court’s order.404 
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FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—REHABILITATIVE SPOUSAL SUPPORT 
SOLEM V. SOLEM 
In Solem v. Solem,405 the North Dakota Supreme Court held the fact 
that an award of rehabilitative spousal support is to last longer than the 
length of the marriage does not, alone, indicate the award is clearly errone-
ous.406  In Solem, Scott Solem appealed a divorce judgment awarding Erica 
Solem spousal support.407 
Scott Solem argued that the trial court’s award of spousal support to 
Erica Solem was clearly erroneous as to amount and duration.408  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court stated that the trial court properly analyzed the Ruff-
Fischer guidelines, which are applied when one party is required to pay 
spousal support to the other party, in its judgment.409  The trial court ex-
amined the parties’ ages, earning abilities, needs, physical health, and the 
length of the marriage.410  The trial court also awarded Scott Solem more 
assets, which would help him retain his greater earning capacity, but less 
net equity.411  The trial court did not specifically address the conduct of the 
parties, but the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that trial courts are not 
required to make a specific finding on each factor.412 
Scott Solem also contended that the trial court did not have a basis for 
awarding spousal support for ten years, as the duration of the marriage was 
nine years.413  The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that while there 
must be some factual basis in the record for the length of time support is 
awarded, a trial court is not required to articulate why it awards spousal 
support for a specific length of time.414  The court concluded there was a 
factual basis in the record for the ten-year duration of spousal support, and 
held the fact that the award of rehabilitative spousal support was to last 
longer than the length of the marriage did not, alone, indicate the award was 
clearly erroneous.415 
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The state supreme court also concluded that while the division of prop-
erty was not equal, it was equitable, and the trial court explained the dis-
parity.416  Thus, the trial court’s spousal support determination was not 
clearly erroneous, even considering the unequal distribution of property.417  
Finally, the court concluded evidence established Erica Solem proved her 
standard of living at trial, thus supporting the trial court’s determination of 
spousal support.418 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding the fact that an 
award of rehabilitative spousal support is to last longer than the length of 
the marriage does not, alone, indicate the award is clearly erroneous.419 
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FAMILY LAW—DIVORCE—SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
KELLY V. KELLY 
In Kelly v. Kelly,420 Richard Kelly appealed a district court judgment 
granting him a divorce from Karol Kelly, but concluding that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the incidents of the mar-
riage.421  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding 
the district court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the tribal 
court to adjudicate the incidents of the marriage.422 
Richard Kelly sought a divorce from Karol Kelly in state district 
court.423  Richard Kelly is a non-Indian.424  Karol Kelly and G.K., the par-
ties’ daughter, are enrolled members of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, and 
Karol Kelly owned non-trust farm and ranch land on the Standing Rock 
Reservation.425  Richard and Karol Kelly married in Las Vegas, Nevada.426  
Their daughter was conceived and born off of the reservation.427  The fami-
ly lived together on the reservation until Richard Kelly left the home and 
moved to Bismarck.428  Richard Kelly commenced a divorce action in state 
court in December 2006.429  Karol Kelly answered and filed a counterclaim, 
requesting that she be granted a divorce, that she receive child custody, 
child support, spousal support, and attorney fees, and that the court make an 
equitable division of property.430  Richard Kelly contended the parties at-
tempted to reconcile, and Karol Kelly and their daughter lived with him in 
Bismarck from March through June of 2007.431 
In December 2007, the district court awarded Richard Kelly holiday 
visitation with G.K.432  In January 2008, Karol Kelly commenced a separate 
divorce action in tribal court and served a motion in the pending state court 
action seeking dismissal of that action based on a lack of subject matter 
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jurisdiction.433  She asserted for the first time that the tribal court had 
exclusive jurisdiction in the matter.434 
The district court first held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and 
dismissed the action in its entirety.435  After Richard Kelly filed a motion 
for reconsideration, however, the district court issued an Order Upon Re-
consideration, holding it had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage but lacked 
jurisdiction over the incidents of the marriage.436  The district court then 
granted Richard Kelly a divorce from Karol Kelly, but dismissed the rest of 
the action.437 
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that state court jurisdiction 
over certain claims is prohibited if it would “undermine the authority of the 
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right 
of the Indians to govern themselves.”438  The court also noted that the In-
dian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which creates exclusive jurisdiction in the 
tribal court for certain child custody proceedings involving an Indian child, 
does not apply to an award of custody to a parent in a divorce proceed-
ing.439  The exclusion, the court stated, recognizes the concurrent jurisdic-
tion of state and tribal courts in such cases.440 
The court distinguished Byzewski v. Byzewski,441 which concluded that 
the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over child custody and support in 
a state divorce action infringed on the right of the reservation Indians to 
make and be ruled by their own laws.442  The court held the case at hand 
differed from Byzewski in two main areas.443  First, the court stated that un-
der the current case, many critical incidents of the marriage occurred off the 
reservation, such as where the marriage occurred, where the child was con-
ceived and born, where Richard Kelly moved while the marriage was still 
ongoing, and where the parties owned property and a business.444  Second, 
the court noted that under the current case, the state court action was first in 
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time and had been ongoing for more than a year when Karol Kelly first at-
tempted to invoke the jurisdiction of the tribal court.445 
The North Dakota Supreme Court also recognized that the state, as well 
as the tribe, has a significant interest in cases involving family issues and 
child welfare.446  In cases with off-reservation impact or cases that occur off 
of the reservation, state courts thus have concurrent jurisdiction with tribal 
courts.447  The court held that numerous factors supported the district 
court’s authority to exercise concurrent jurisdiction.448 
The district court was also required, however, to apply the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) when deter-
mining jurisdiction of the child custody issue.449  On remand, then, the state 
supreme court directed the district court to give the parties an opportunity to 
present evidence relevant to the jurisdictional facts and to determine wheth-
er the state, the reservation, or neither was the child’s home state for pur-
poses of UCCJEA analysis.450 
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded by stating the district 
court erred in determining it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the incidents of the marriage.451  It reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with its opinion.452 
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PARTNERSHIPS—LIMITED PARTNER RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
RED RIVER WINGS, INC. V. HOOT, INC. 
In Red River Wings, Inc. v. Hoot, Inc.,453 the majority limited partners 
in two limited partnerships appealed from a judgment awarding damages 
and attorney fees to the minority of the limited partners.454  The majority 
partners also appealed the district court’s dismissal of the majority’s claims 
against persons and entities involved in a business dispute over two Hooters 
franchise restaurants in Canada.455  The North Dakota Supreme Court af-
firmed the district court’s finding that the partnerships were dissolved nine-
ty days after removing the general partner of both partnerships.456  The 
court also affirmed the district court’s holding that the majority partners 
were liable for breach of fiduciary duties.457  The court reversed and re-
manded for proper determination of damages, including prejudgment inter-
est against the company providing management services to the partner-
ships.458  Finally, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
management company’s counterclaim for intentional interference with con-
tractual relations.459 
In the mid-1990s, Thomas Lavelle, a Fargo restaurant manager, was 
informed of a series of potential business ventures when Hooters of 
America sought to expand into Canada.460  Lavelle entered into a franchise 
agreement with Hooters of America to establish a Hooters restaurant in 
Edmonton, Alberta, along with purchase options for future Canadian 
restaurants.461  Canadian Wings Investment Limited Partnership (Canadian 
Wings) was formed to finance and organize the Edmonton restaurant 
venture.462  Lavelle operated under Red River Wings, Inc. (Red River 
Wings) as general partner of Canadian Wings.463  Lavelle, as sole 
shareholder of LTM, Ltd. (LTM), also provided management services for 
the restaurant.464  Ownership units of Canadian Wings were sold to various 
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investors, including ME Investments, LLP (ME Investments).465  Louis 
Emerson and Arthur Stern received fees and profits-only interests as special 
limited partners for their services in the endeavor.466  Lavelle borrowed 
money to construct the Edmonton Hooters restaurant and the limited 
partners received healthy returns.467 
Shortly after the Edmonton restaurant was finished, Lavelle undertook 
to establish a second Hooters restaurant in Winnipeg, Manitoba.468  This 
venture was structured in the same manner as the Edmonton restaurant, 
with Manitoba Wings Investment Limited Partnership (Manitoba Wings) 
obtaining ownership of the establishment.469  Emerson and Stern received 
similar profits-only interests and many of the same investors joined, includ-
ing ME Investments.470  The investors received lower returns from the 
Winnipeg restaurant.471 
By early 1998, Lavelle’s business relationship with Stern, Emerson, 
and ME Investments began to deteriorate due to alleged poor management 
by Lavelle and the lower-than-expected returns from the Winnipeg restau-
rant.472  In May 1998, ME Investments, Stern, Emerson, and other majority 
limited partners met to address their concerns.473  After no wrongdoing was 
discovered, the majority limited partners nevertheless decided to take over 
management of the two partnerships and sought to remove Red River 
Wings as general partner.474 
In October 1998, the majority limited partners, without notice to the 
minority partners, removed Red River Wings as the general partner of both 
partnerships.475  Hoot, Inc. (Hoot) was formed to take over as general part-
ner.476  The majority partners also terminated the management contracts 
with LTM.477  Although Lavelle offered to alter the distribution allocations 
in favor of the majority partners and despite protests by the minority limited 
partners, the takeover was completed.478  Stern and Emerson proceeded to 
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physically take control of the two restaurants, with expenses paid by the 
partnerships.479 
The majority partners sued Lavelle, Red River Wings, LTM, and others 
in federal court, seeking damages.480  The suit was dismissed, without 
prejudice, after two years of litigation and $350,000 in fees and costs.481  
Despite the objections of the minority partners, the majority partners voted 
to continue the lawsuit against Lavelle as a partnership claim and for the 
partnerships to assume the costs of the litigation.482  The minority partners 
then successfully obtained a temporary restraining order to prevent the 
majority partners from taking the funds from the partnership.483  After a 
receiver was appointed for both partnerships, Hooters of America 
demanded that Lavelle be involved in the franchise.484  The majority 
partners refused to compromise, and Hooters of America terminated the 
franchises and issued them to Lavelle personally.485  The remaining assets 
of the partnerships were then liquidated and sold at a judicially approved 
sale to Lavelle.486 
The minority limited partners sued the majority limited partners deriva-
tively and individually for breach of the partnership agreements and breach 
of fiduciary duties, and sought dissolution and accounting of the partner-
ships.487  The majority limited partners refiled their dismissed federal court 
action against Red River Wings, Lavelle, and LTM in state court.488  La-
velle, through Red River Wings, also sued Hoot for damages for wrongfully 
withholding distributions.489  The cases were consolidated, and the district 
court awarded damages to the minority partners and Lavelle for breach of 
fiduciary duties and awarded partial attorney fees.490  The majority group’s 
claims were dismissed, and LTM and Lavelle were awarded damages for 
services provided prior to the takeover.491 
The first issue the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed was whether 
the district court erred in holding as a matter of law that Canadian Wings 
and Manitoba Wings were dissolved when the majority partners voted to 
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remove Red River Wings as general partner.492  Under the terms of the 
partnership agreements, the general partner could be removed, with or 
without cause, by a vote of fifty-one percent of the limited partners.493  
However, the agreement only provided for the appointment of a successor 
general partner in the event of resignation, dissolution, or bankruptcy of the 
general partner, not in the case of removal.494  The Supreme Court held that 
although the majority partners had authority to remove Red River Wings as 
general partner, the agreements did not address the appointment of a suc-
cessor in doing so.495 
Under the statute in effect at the time, after removal of a general part-
ner, the limited partners had ninety days to unanimously appoint a succes-
sor general partner.496  Failure to do so resulted in statutory dissolution.497  
The court held that the agreements and law in effect at the time were clear 
and unambiguous.498  Since there was no unanimous written consent of all 
limited partners within ninety days to appoint a new general partner, the 
partnerships were dissolved.499  The court affirmed the district court’s hold-
ing of dissolution, but determined that it had erred in placing the date of 
dissolution as October 25, 1998.500  Instead, the dissolution occurred when 
the ninety-day period expired on January 23, 1999.501 
The court next turned to the majority partners’ arguments that the dis-
trict court erred in finding them liable for breach of fiduciary duties.502  The 
majority partners first argued that they could not be held liable in this case 
because under the statute in effect at the time, a limited partner could not be 
liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless the limited partner 
participated in the control of the business.503  In rejecting this argument, the 
court contrasted obligations owed to the partnership with fiduciary du-
ties.504  The court held that the statutory fiduciary duties imposed on part-
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ners are the duties of loyalty and care and the obligations of good faith and 
fair dealing.505 
The court next addressed whether the majority limited partners 
breached their fiduciary duties.506  Specifically, the district court found that 
the majority limited partners breached fiduciary duties when they attempted 
to take over the businesses and install Hoot as general partner.507  The Su-
preme Court reviewed the record and held that the district court’s holding 
was not clearly erroneous.508  The evidence showed that the majority group 
planned a takeover and proceeded in a reckless manner.509  Specifically, the 
majority limited partners ignored their attorneys’ advice to obtain unanim-
ous consent for the appointment of a new general partner, failed to obtain 
consent and give notice to Hooters of America to replace Red River Wings, 
hired two replacement management companies without notice or vote, di-
rectly controlled Hoot and the partnerships, and refused to surrender control 
to the court-appointed receiver.510  The court, therefore, upheld the district 
court’s findings that the majority group took control and dominated the 
partnerships for their own interests and violated their fiduciary duties.511 
The court further held that the district court did not err in holding Kes-
selring and Leno individually responsible.512  The court explained that the 
“limited partnership veils” of Canadian Wings and Manitoba Wings did not 
need to be “pierced” in order to hold them individually liable.513  Similar to 
shareholders in a close corporation, majority limited partners who con-
trolled or acted in concert with the general partner can be held personally 
liable for damages and breach of fiduciary duties.514  Furthermore, since 
Emerson, Stern, and ME Investments, through Kesselring and Leno, parti-
cipated in the takeover, the district court did not err in finding that ME In-
vestments was a mere alter ego of Kesselring and Leno.515  The court ap-
plied the principle for piercing a corporate veil that if unity of interest and 
ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner make the entity 
nonexistent, the corporate structure is abandoned.516  Given the evidence of 
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Kesselring and Leno’s level of participation in the takeover, the district 
court did not err in holding them personally liable.517 
The Supreme Court also upheld the district court’s finding that 
Kesselring and Leno’s actions were not protected by the business judgment 
rule, because they acted recklessly, with bad faith, and to further the 
majority group’s own interests.518  The business judgment rule prohibits 
judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and 
with honest judgment to further corporate purposes.519  The rule does not 
protect self-dealing, willful misconduct, or gross negligence.520  The 
evidence showed the majority partners acted recklessly in installing Hoot as 
the general partner without unanimous consent.521  The majority group 
acted in bad faith by failing to relinquish control to the receiver and by 
concocting reasons for removing Red River Wings and terminating the 
contracts with LTM after the fact in order to justify their actions.522  Since 
these actions were taken for the self-interest of the majority partners, the 
district court did not err in rejecting their business judgment rule 
argument.523 
The Supreme Court next addressed the majority group’s contention that 
the district court erred in dismissing their claims against Lavelle and Red 
River Wings for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and fraud.524  
Among the majority partners contentions were that Lavelle and Red River 
Wings plundered partnership property and opportunities, wrongfully in-
flated compensation, made an unapproved advance to an unrelated restau-
rant, comingled funds, and took advantage of the partners in bad faith by 
usurping profits.525  The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that 
there was no credible evidence to support these claims.526  Instead, the 
record contained evidence that the partnership funds were accounted for and 
used for the benefit of partnership purposes.527  The court made it clear that 
the task of weighing the evidence and judging credibility of witnesses fell 
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on the trier of fact, and that it is not the role of the reviewing court to re-
weigh credibility or resolve conflicts in the evidence.528 
The court then turned to the district court’s calculation of damages.529  
The district court awarded derivative damages based on an analysis by the 
minority group’s expert who calculated the reasonable profits and distribu-
tions that could have been realized absent the breach of fiduciary duties and 
dissolution.530  This calculation was based on prior performance of the part-
nerships, projected profits, and the value of the partnerships as of the date 
of the takeover.531  The Supreme Court stressed that recoverable damages 
include the value of the profits which would have otherwise been received, 
including anticipated profits.532  Further, a reviewing court will not reverse 
an award of damages unless it is clearly erroneous or outside the range of 
the evidence presented.533  The court determined the method used to deter-
mine damages for lost profits was neither unreasonable nor speculative.534  
However, since it previously concluded that the date of dissolution was 
January 23, 1999, rather than October 25, 1998, the court reversed and re-
manded in order to calculate damages according to the later date.535  The 
court also summarily affirmed the district court’s award of distributions to 
Red River Wings from Hoot, because Red River Wings did not fulfill its 
obligation under the partnership agreements to contribute one percent of the 
total capital raised by the partnerships.536 
The district court awarded the minority limited partners $104,130 in at-
torney fees.537  Although the minority group requested $222,734, the district 
court disallowed any attorney fees accumulated before the case was filed on 
September 26, 2002.538  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed and 
recognized that the derivative claims in the matter were intertwined with 
other asserted claims.539  Because not all of the efforts were directly or indi-
rectly related to the derivative matters, the court determined that these fees, 
along with duplicative and unreasonable efforts, were not recoverable, and 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the award.540 
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The Supreme Court of North Dakota next addressed LTM’s argument 
that the district court erred in dismissing its counterclaim against the ma-
jority group for terminating its management contracts with Canadian Wings 
and Manitoba Wings.541  LTM asserted intentional interference with its con-
tractual relationship.542  This required LTM to prove that the contracts were 
breached and that the majority group instigated the breaches without justifi-
cation.543  The management agreements between LTM and the two partner-
ships provided for termination only with cause constituting fraud, felonious 
conduct, dishonesty, willful misconduct, gross negligence, or material 
breach of the agreement.544  The district court found that the reasons put 
forth by the majority partners for terminating the agreements were con-
cocted from information received after termination and that no cause ex-
isted.545  However, the lower court dismissed LTM’s counterclaim, reason-
ing the dissolution destroyed the objective of the management contracts.546 
The Supreme Court found that neither the doctrine of frustration of 
purpose nor the doctrine of impossibility applied, because the frustration or 
impossibility was caused by the majority group.547  Just as a party to a 
contract who causes frustration or impossibility cannot rely on the doctrines 
as defenses to a breach of contract, third parties who cause the frustration or 
impossibility cannot rely on the defenses in an action for intentional 
interference with a contractual relationship.548  Therefore, since the majority 
limited partners caused the dissolution of the partnerships, the dissolution 
could not be used as a defense to LTM’s counterclaim.549  The state 
supreme court reversed the district court’s dismissal of LTM’s counterclaim 
and remanded for findings on whether the majority group should be liable 
for damages for intentional interference with the contract.550 
The final issue presented to the court was whether the district court 
erred in awarding LTM prejudgment interest for unpaid management fees at 
a rate of three percent.551  The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that in-
terest on LTM’s unpaid management fees should have started accumulating 
 
541. Id. ¶ 52. 
542. Id. 
543. Id. ¶ 53, 751 N.W.2d at 225-26 (citing Van Sickle v. Hallmark & Assocs., Inc., 2008 
ND 12, ¶ 24, 744 N.W.2d 532, 540). 
544. Id. ¶ 54, 751 N.W.2d at 226. 
545. Id. ¶ 55. 
546. Id. 
547. Id. ¶ 56, 751 N.W.2d at 226-27. 
548. Id., 751 N.W.2d at 227. 
549. Id. 
550. Id. ¶ 57. 
551. Id. ¶ 58. 
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when the contracts with the partnerships were terminated.552  Further, the 
statutory interest rate for any legal indebtedness, when not specified in the 
agreement, is six percent, rather than three percent.553  The Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded for calculation of prejudgment interest according-
ly.554 
In Red River Wings, Inc., the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s dismissal of LTM’s counterclaim for intentional interference 
with contractual relations and remanded for further findings.555  The court 
reversed and remanded the award of derivative damages resulting from the 
dissolution of the limited partnerships on an earlier date.556  The court also 
reversed and remanded for entry of an order awarding prejudgment interest 
to LTM at six percent from the date the management contracts were termi-
nated.557  In all other respects, the district court was affirmed.558 
 
552. Id. ¶ 59. 
553. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-14-05 (2007)). 
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TORT LAW—WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION—DECEDENT’S 
CHILDREN ENTITLED TO SEEK RECOVERY OF DAMAGES 
WEIGEL V. LEE 
In Weigel v. Lee,559 decedent’s children appealed the district court’s 
dismissal of their wrongful death claims, arguing that the district court mis-
construed the wrongful death statutes.560  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded, holding that a decedent’s children are able to seek 
recovery of non-economic damages in a wrongful death action.561 
On May 6, 2004, Darlyne Rogers went to the emergency room of St. 
Luke’s Hospital in Crosby, North Dakota, where X-rays revealed she 
suffered from pneumonia and a bowel obstruction.562  Rogers was 
subsequently transferred to Trinity Hospital in Minot, North Dakota, as Dr. 
Lane Lee’s patient.563  Although she was critically ill, Rogers was admitted 
to a room on the “regular” floor of the hospital.564  Several hours later, she 
began vomiting bodily waste and aspirating it into her lungs.565  She 
ultimately died.566 
Rogers’ adult children—Darla Weigel, Melody Frieson, Diana Seney, 
and Lorna Strand—brought suit against Dr. Lee and Trinity Hospital, alleg-
ing negligence.567  Ultimately, after blending wrongful death actions, sur-
vival actions, and loss of consortium claims arising out of personal injury 
actions, the district court dismissed the children’s claim, finding no recov-
ery was proper.568 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district 
court erred when it blended three distinct claims for tortious conduct: 1) 
loss of consortium claims arising out of personal injury actions, 2) survival 
actions, and 3) wrongful death actions.569  The court then distinguished each 
claim using statutory interpretation, a question of law that is fully 
reviewable on appeal.570 
 
559. 2008 ND 147, 752 N.W.2d 618. 
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First, the court stated, English common law recognized an action for 
loss of consortium arising out of tortious conduct that resulted in personal 
injury.571  In Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337,572 the court recog-
nized that both spouses have a right to recover for loss of consortium, but 
the court refused to extend that type of recovery to children.573  Here, how-
ever, the court noted that the refusal to extend recovery was inapplicable, as 
the decedent’s children brought a wrongful death claim, not a claim for loss 
of consortium arising out of tortious conduct that resulted in personal in-
jury.574 
Second, the court reviewed survival actions.575  Section 28-01-26.1 of 
the North Dakota Century Code provides, “No action or claim for relief, 
except for breach of promise, alienation of affections, libel, and slander, 
abates by the death of a party or of a person who might have been a party 
had such death not occurred.”576  Survival statutes are meant to permit 
recovery by the representatives of the deceased for damages the deceased 
could have recovered if he or she had lived.577  Again, the court noted, the 
decedent’s children in the case at issue brought a wrongful death claim, not 
a survival action, so the law concerning survival actions was 
inapplicable.578 
Third and finally, the North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed chapter 
32-21 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides for wrongful 
death actions.579  The decedent’s children offered the wrongful death act as 
the legal basis for their claim, and the court concluded that they were en-
titled to seek compensation for Rogers’ wrongful death.580  The court wrote 
that contemporary wrongful death statutes tend to address a broader scope 
of injuries, including those considered non-pecuniary.581  Chapter 32-21 of 
the North Dakota Century Code states: 
 Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful 
act, neglect, or default, and the act, neglect, or default is such as 
would have entitled the party injured, if death had not ensued, to 
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maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then 
and in every such case the person who, or the corporation, limited 
liability company, or company which, would have been liable if 
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured or of the tort-
feasor, and although the death shall have been caused under such 
circumstances as amount in law to felony.582 
This statute, the court wrote, is not a survival statute intended to in-
crease the estate of the deceased, but rather a wrongful death statute, with 
damages based on the loss suffered by the beneficiaries, not the loss sus-
tained by decedent’s estate.583  Compensable damages available in wrongful 
death actions are both economic, including those for medical expenses, loss 
of earnings, and burial costs, and noneconomic, including damages for pain 
and suffering, mental anguish, loss of society and companionship, and loss 
of consortium.584 
Intended recipients under the wrongful death act are “the decedent’s 
heirs at law.”585  The court clarified that “heirs at law” for purposes of the 
wrongful death statute are “those persons who by the laws of descent would 
succeed to the property of the decedent in case of intestacy, but in addition, 
that if members of a preferred class are precluded from recovery for reasons 
other than death those next entitled to inherit may be considered beneficia-
ries.”586 
The court also clarified that persons entitled to recover damages under 
the wrongful death act should not be confused with persons statutorily au-
thorized to bring an action.587  Section 32-21-03 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code states that the action shall be brought by the following persons in 
the order named: 
1.  The surviving husband or wife, if any. 
2.  The surviving children, if any. 
3.  The surviving mother or father. 
4.  A surviving grandparent. 
5.  The personal representative. 
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6.  A person who has had primary physical custody of the dece-
dent before the wrongful act. 
If any person entitled to bring the action refuses or neglects so 
to do for a period of thirty days after demand of the person 
next in order, that person may bring the action.588 
The court went on to state that the distinction between persons eligible 
to seek damages from wrongful death actions and those entitled to bring 
such actions is important, because the trial judge must split recovery among 
eligible heirs.589  Overlap may exist between plaintiffs bringing the action 
and those entitled to damages, but the court emphasized that those able to 
bring the action do not have an absolute right to the damages recovered; 
they must instead bring the action in a representative capacity for the exclu-
sive benefit of those entitled to recover.590  Thus, surviving children are eli-
gible to bring a wrongful death action under section 32-21-03(2) of the 
North Dakota Century Code if the decedent had no eligible spouse or if the 
spouse fails to bring an action for thirty days after the children make a de-
mand—a separate issue from that of whether children can recover damages 
in a wrongful death action.591 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding 
that a decedent’s children are entitled to seek recovery of damages in a 
wrongful death action.592 
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